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I. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotatled 78-2a-3(g) as 
amended which states: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over . . . 
(g) Appeals from district coulrts 
involving domestic relations cases 
including, but not limite|d to, 
divorce, annulment, propeirty 
division, child custody, (support 
and visitation, adoption, and 
paternity. 
II. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS jBELOW 
This appeal is taken from the ruling on 
defendant's Motion to Set Aside A Judgment for Divorce based 
upon the plaintiff's Complaint and the stipulation of both 
parties entered in Civil No. 5603 in the (Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for Grand County, Sltate of Utah. 
III. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issue is presented for review: 
1. DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE UNDER RULE 60(b) WHERE THE 
DEFENDANT WIFE ALLEGED IN HER AFFIDAVIT THAT HER SIGNATURE 
ON THE STIPULATION WAS OBTAINED BY THREATS AND INTIMIDATION, 
BUT THE ALLEGED CONFRONTATION OCCURRED THREE DAYS AFTER THE 
STIPULATION WAS SIGNED, AND THE MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT WAS 
FILED THE DAY AFTER THE COURT RULED ON THE MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT. 
IV. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no determinative Constitution 
provisions. 
Rule 77(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
under Part X, District Courts and Clerks provides: 
(b) Trials and hearings; orders in 
chambers. All trials upon the merits 
shall be conducted in open court and so 
far as convenient in a regular 
courtroom. All other acts or 
proceedings may be done or conducted by 
a judge in chambers without the* 
attendance of the clerk or other court 
officials and at any place within the 
state, either within or without the 
district; but no hearings, other than 
one ex parte, shall be conducted outside 
the county wherein the matter is pending 
without the consent of all the parties 
to the action affected thereby. 
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Rule 2,8 of the Utah Rules of Practice, Dis 
and Circuit Courts, provides in applicable parts: 
(a) All motions, except uncontested or 
ex parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a brief statement of points temd 
authorities and any affidavits relied 
upon in support thereof, . . 
(b) The responding party shall file 
and serve upon all parties within ten 
(10) days after service of the motion, a 
statement of answering points and 
authorities and counter-affidavits. 
(c) The moving party may serve and 
file reply points and authorities within 
five (5) days after service of 
responding party's points and 
authorities. Upon the expiratibn of 
such five (5) day period to file reply 
points and authorities, either party may 
notify the clerk to submit the patter 
for decision. 
(f) Decision shall be rendered without 
a hearing unless requested by the court, 
in which event the clerk shall set a 
date and time for such hearing. 
(g) In all cases where the granting of 
a motion would dispose of the action or 
any issues thereof on the merits with 
prejudice, the party resisting the 
motion may request a hearing and such 
request shall be granted unless the 
motion is summarily denied. If no such 
request is made within ten (10) days of 
notice to submit for decision, a hearing 
on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
Rule 4.5 of the Utah Rules of Pjractice, Dis 
and Circuit Courts, provides in applicable part: 
(b) Stipulations. No orders, 
judgments or decrees upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless such 
stipulation is in writing, signed by the 
attorneys of record for the respective 
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parties and filed with the clerk, 
provided that the stipulation may be 
made orally in open court. 
Administrative Order 3 of the Supplementary Rules 
of Practice and Seventh Judicial District provides: 
Copies of motions and supporting 
memorandums to judges under Rule 2.8 of 
the Uniform Rules of Practice. When 
motions are submitted to the Court with 
supporting memorandums in accordance 
with Rule 2.8 of the Uniform Rules of 
Practice, and any requests for ruling, 
counsel shall file the originals with 
the Clerk of the Court and mail or 
deliver courtesy copies to the office of 
the District Judge in Price, Utah, when 
the matter is filed in Carbon, Emery, 
Grand or San Juan Counties, and to the 
office of the District Judge in Vernal, 
Utah, when the matter is filed in 
Duchesne, Uintah or Daggett Counties. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case involves a divorce action filed by Roger 
E. Puckett (plaintiff) against Carolyn E« Puckett 
(defendant) on September 25, 1987. The matter was heard in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court on November 2, 1987, at 
which time the plaintiff was granted a divorce based on his 
complaint and on a stipulation which had been filed on 
October 19, 1987. A Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment relative to the property distribution was filed on 
February 12, 1988, The motion was denied on March 10, 1988. 
Notice of this appeal was filed on April 6, 1988. 
The chronology of events in thijs case is very 
relevant to the issue raised for review. The plaintiff 
first consulted an attorney in this matter on September 19, 
1987. The verified complaint was filed o|n September 25, 
1987. Plaintiff moved from the residence) on September 27, 
1987. A stipulation relative to property division and 
wherein the defendant stated she did not intend to contest 
this action was signed, first by the defendant and then by 
the plaintiff, on Friday, October 16, 19817. It was filed 
with the court at 2:16 p.m. on October 19|, 1987. The 
confrontation complained of by the defendant wherein the 
plaintiff attempted to take the credit ce^ rds from the 
defendant occurred the evening of October 19, 1987, three 
days after the signing of the stipulation, according to the 
affidavit filed by the defendant. 
Because the defendant was anxious to move to Texas 
and enter nursing school, the ninety day waiting period was 
waived and the matter was heard in court on November 2, 
1987. The court found that the stipulation entered into by 
the parties was reasonable and ordered that its terms be 
incorporated into the findings and decree. The judge signed 
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the findings and decree on November 16th and they were filed 
with the court on November 17, 1987. 
The Notice of Entry of Judgment and a copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of 
Divorce were mailed to defendant at her new address in Texas 
on November 18, 1987. 
Defendant's attorney entered his appearance and 
filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment under Rule 60(b) on 
February 12, 1988. The Memorandum of plaintiff's attorney 
in answer to the motion was filed on February 22, 1988. 
There was no reply brief from defendant's attorney and on 
March 10, 1988, the judge made his ruling on defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, while in his office in Price. 
The decision was mailed to the clerk of the court in Moab 
and arrived on March 11, 1988, the same day that the Motion 
for Oral Argument was received by the clerk of the court in 
Moab from defendant's attorney. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on April 6, 1988, 
resulting in this present action. 
It should be noted that defendant's attorney never 
asked the Seventh Judicial District Court for a ruling on 
his Motion for Oral Argument or raised the matter again in 
any way with the Seventh Judicial District Court. There is 
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no indication that Administrative Order 3 of the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice for the Seventh Judicial 
District was followed. 
The court never refused to allow the defendant a 
hearing on her motion. Rather, the request was not timely 
filed. Therefore, it cannot be the basis for a claim of 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Before addressing the legal argument in this 
matter, it is necessary to address the factual inaccuracies 
in the Appellant's Statement of the Case. 
The only emotional or nervous breakdown of the 
appellant of which the respondent is aware occurred ten 
years prior to the institution of this acltion, not shortly 
before. (See Affidavit of Roger Puckett, pages 1 and 2, 
paragraphs 3 and 4, appendix "A".) She wlas not under the 
care of a physician for any nervous disorder during the 
pendency of this action. Based on reports from plaintiff's 
insurance company relative to doctor's bills and 
prescriptions, he believes the defendant for the first time 
in years saw a doctor for any kind of emotional distress on 
October 29, 1987. (See Affidavit of Roger Puckett, page 7, 
paragraph 9, appendix "A".) She was not taking any kind of 
tranquilizer or medication for depression or emotional 
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distress during the pendency of this action prior to October 
29, 1987, unless she was paying for it herself rather than 
securing it through the family's insurance. 
The defendant states she was not advised to seek 
legal representation during the original action. This is 
refuted by paragraph 4 of the stipulation which she signed 
wherein it was stated that she understood her right to be 
represented by separate counsel and had had all matters 
pertaining to this action fully explained to her. (See 
paragraph 4, Exhibit MBM.) That language was purposely 
included because defendant repeatedly resisted suggestions 
that she obtain counsel. This information was incorporated 
in the Findings of Fact and the Decree of Divorce. 
The affidavit of Connie Navarre states that at the 
time defendant was in the attorney's office reading the 
stipulation with her daughter, she was told that if there 
were any terms she did not agree with, she should not sign 
the stipulation. (See affidavit of Connie Navarre, page 2, 
paragraph 5, Exhibit ,,CM.) A modification in one paragraph 
was made at her request. There was no request at that time 
by defendant to talk with plaintiff's attorney. Rather, 
defendant deliberately ignored the attorney, even when 
spoken to by her. 
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At the time this action was initiated and pending, 
defendant was gainfully employed at the Canyonlands Campark 
in Moab, Utah and had been for several years. She had a 
checking account in her own name at Williamsburg Savings 
Bank in Moab and had the complete discretionary use of all 
of her income as plaintiff paid all the household bills and 
furnished her $480.00 per month for groceries. She had her 
own money with which she could have hired her own attorney, 
if she wished to do so. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse i|ts discretion in 
not conducting a hearing on defendant's MIotion to Set Aside 
the Judgment when the request for oral arguments was not 
submitted timely and the decision on the motion had already 
been made before the request was received. 
In considering the Rule 60(b) motion, the trial 
court addressed the question of fraud and duress and found 
that the defendant failed to make even a prima facie showing 
of either. 
Upon consideration of the values of marital assets 
provided in the plaintiff's affidavit, the court concluded 
there was a reasonable distribution of the marital assets. 
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The evidence does not clearly preponderate against 
these findings and there is no showing that any inequity 
resulted from the order so as to constitute an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion. 
The basis for disturbing the lower court1s ruling 
on either the Rule 60(b) motion or the property distribution 
would be an abuse of discretion. Clearly, there has been 
none. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
EQINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT A HEARING 
ON HER MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DIVORCE 
DECREE UNDER RULE 60(b) WHERE THE MOTION 
REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT WAS NOT FILED 
UNTIL AFTER THE COURT HAD RULED ON THE 
RULE 60(b) MOTION. 
Regardless of the differences in the proffered 
evidence of the parties, on appeal the question raised is 
whether the judge abused his discretion by making a decision 
on a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment under Rule 60(b) 
without a hearing. 
Rule 77, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
under paragraph (b): 
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f,All trials upon the merits shall be 
conducted in open court and so far as 
convenient in a regular courtroom. All 
other acts or proceedings may be done or 
conducted by a judge in chambjers without 
the attendance of the clerk ojr other 
court officials and at any place within 
the state, either within or wlithout the 
district . . •" 
Clearly, a district court judjge may rule on 
motions at any place within the state. This ruling was made 
at the judge's office in Price. At the time of the ruling, 
no request for oral argument had been filed. (See Ruling on 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, page 2, d|ate line, Exhibit "D" 
and Motion for Oral Argument, page 1, dlate stamp of District 
Court, Exhibit "E".) 
Section (f) of Rule 2.8 of the Utah Rules of 
Practice, District and Circuit Courts, (followed in the 
Seventh District) states that "Decisions shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless requested by the court . . .tf 
While it is not clear whether this section is applicable 
only to motions for summary judgment which are covered in 
paragraphs (d) and (e) or to all motions, we submit that it 
applies to all motions as there is no limiting language in 
the text. 
Rule 2.8 provides under (g) that the party 
E§§i§iiDg a motion which would dispose of an action with 
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prejudice may request a hearing within ten days of the time 
when the motion is submitted for decision. This time would 
be after the five day period for submission of a reply brief 
has expired. If not requested within ten days, a hearing on 
the motion is deemed waived. 
There is no provision in Rule 2.8 for the party 
submitting the motion to request a hearing. However, in 
practice, a request for a hearing, if requested, most often 
accompanies the motion at the time it is filed. That was 
not done in this case. The defendant did not request a 
hearing until eighteen days after the plaintiff's reply 
memorandum of points and authorities was filed with the 
court and a month after the Rule 60(b) motion was filed. 
During this time, the judge had already ruled on the motion. 
In addition, applying the provisions of Rule 2.8(g), a 
hearing on the motion would be deemed waived. 
If the defendant had provided a courtesy copy to 
the judge in Price, the court would have made a ruling on 
his Motion for Oral Arguments. As there is no ruling on the 
motion in file, there is reason to believe Administrative 
Order No. 3 of the Supplemental Rules of Practice for the 
Seventh Judicial District was not followed. 
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The judge did not abuse his discretion by not 
waiting for a request for oral argument to be filed. He had 
no indication such a request would be filed. If the 
defendant's attorney had wanted a hearing on the motion, he 
easily could have requested it at the time he filed the 
motion. To call the failure of the defendant's attorney to 
timely request a hearing on a motion an abuse of discretion 
by the judge would be grossly inequitable and contrary to 
the Rules of Practice and the Rules of Procedure. 
POINT II 
THB COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN RULING DEFENDANT HAD NOT ESTABLISHED 
FRAUD OR DURESS IN THE SIGNING OF THE 
STIPULATION WHEN SHE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY 
DATES OR DOCTOR'S NAMES RELATIVE TO 
MEDICAL TREATMENT, ALLEGE ANY 4CT 
CONSTITUTING FRAUD, AND THE ON^ ACT 
COMPLAINED OF OCCURRED THREE DAYS AFTER 
THE SIGNING OF THE STIPULATION. 
The allegation by the defendant in the motion to 
set aside the verdict is that plaintiff fraudulently induced 
the defendant to sign the stipulation. l\rt his accompanying 
memorandum and in the accompanying affidavit of defendant, 
there is not one act alleged that indicates any fraudulent 
act on the part of the plaintiff. 
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The case relied upon by appellant, Boyce v. Boyce, 
609 P.2d 298 (Utah 1980) involved a situation where the 
husband had knowingly and purposely provided false 
information in response to requests for discovery and 
apparently continued giving false information in the court 
proceedings. Over an extended period of time, he lied to 
both the wife and the court. Based on those actions by the 
husband, the court found that the procedures in the court 
were not equitable or just and that the trial court had not 
therefore based its decision on the most accurate 
information which could have been gathered. In Boyce, the 
husband defrauded not only the wife but also the court. For 
that reason, the Supreme Court remanded the case to be 
reconsidered. The standard for review provided by Boyce is 
for cases involving fraud by one of the parties. 
Nothing of like facts has occurred in this case. 
No fraudulent act has been alleged or established by the 
defendant. The plaintiff furnished full and accurate 
information by affidavit to the court at the time the Rule 
60(b) motion was being considered. (See Affidavit of Roger 
Puckett, pages 3-6, paragraph 8, Exhibit '"A".) The 
defendant had the same opportunity to give estimated values 
of the marital property. She furnished no factual 
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information to even raise a question as to the 
reasonableness and fairness of the property distribution. 
(See Affidavit of Carolyn Puckett, page 2„ paragraph l.a 
through 1, Exhibit "F".) The plaintiff mfrde full 
disclosure, under oath. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN USING THE PROPERLY EXECUTED 
STIPULATION AS PART OF THE FINDINGS ON 
WHICH THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION! WAS 
BASED. FURTHER, THE COURT DID HOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO MbDIFY THE 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WHEN DEFENDANT DID 
NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE IT WAS NOT A 
FAIR AND REASONABLE DISTRIBUTION. 
The defendant has made no showing of an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in either the ruling on the 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment under Rule 60(b) or in the 
division of the marital property. 
Determination of the value of assets is 
a matter for the trial court whjich will 
not be reviewed in the absence bf a 
clear abuse of discretion. Turper v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982). 
The stipulation, signed by both parties and 
considered by the judge in the division otf the marital 
property, was found by the court to be reasonable, both 
initially at the trial and after review in considering the 
Rule 60(b) motion. (See Ruling on Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, page 2, paragraphs 2, 3, Exhibit "D".) 
-15-
Defendant has presented no evidence, even by her 
affidavit, that the stipulation was obtained by any 
misconduct of the respondent. The conduct complained of 
happened three days after the signing of the stipulation. 
(See Stipulation, page 2, date line, Exhibit "B" and 
Affidavit of Carolyn Puckett, page 2, paragraph 7, Exhibit 
,fFM.) If the defendant had second thoughts after signing 
the stipulation she had two weeks before the hearing in 
which she could have contacted an attorney and changed her 
mind. 
The stipulation clearly meets the requirements of 
Utah Rules of Practice in District and Circuit Courts 4.5(b) 
in that it was in writing, signed by the parties and by the 
attorney of record and filed with the clerk. It was 
considered by the court in making the property distribution 
between the parties and the court found it to be reasonable. 
In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) 
at p. 789, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Further, it is well recognized that a 
parties1 stipulation as to property 
rights in a divorce action, although 
advisory and usually followed unless the 
court finds it to be unfair or 
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding 
on the trial court. It is only a 
recommendation to be adhered to if the 
court believes it to be fair and 
reasonable. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 
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P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977); |Kl§in v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utcih 1975). 
The court found it to be reasonable both at the 
initial hearing and after consideration of the evidence 
presented by affidavit when considering the Rule 60(b) 
motion. 
The standard of review relative to the division of 
property by the trial court is provided in English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) at petge 410: 
The trial court, in a divorce 
has considerable latitude of i 
in adjusting financial and pr 
interests. A party appealing 
has the burden to prove there 
misunderstanding or misapplic 
the law resulting in substant 
prejudicial error; or the evi 
clearly preponderated against 
finding; or such a serious in 
resulted as to manifest a del 
discretion. 
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discretion, since a fair and equitable 
property distribution is not necessarily 
an equal distribution. (Citation 
omitted.) 
The appellant has presented no evidence indicating 
an inequitable distribution. She has presented no evidence 
of a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in any error, or any evidence that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings. There is no evidence of 
any serious inequity that resulted so as to constitute an 
abuse of the court's discretion. 
In Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the 
Supreme Court states: 
This court endows the trial court's 
adjustment of financial interests of the 
parties with a presumption of validity 
and does not review their values absent 
a clear abuse of discretion. Argyle v. 
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984); 
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 
1982). We do not lightly disturb 
property divisions made by the trial 
court and uphold its decision except 
where to do so would work a manifest 
injustice or inequity. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6, at 8. 
The trial court found not even a prima facie showing of 
fraud or duress or that the property distribution was not 
fair and reasonable. (See Ruling on Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, page 2, last paragraph, Exhibit -"D"•) 
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By her own evidence the conduct of plaintiff 
complained of by defendant occurred thrtee days after the 
signing of the stipulation and thus had no bearing on her 
signing of the stipulation. The stipulation was not signed 
by the defendant in the presence of the plaintiff. 
Defendant was accompanied to the attorney's office 
by her daughter, Amber Sargent, at the time she signed the 
stipulation and absolutely no pressure or influence was 
applied to secure her signature on the stipulation. 
Defendant received her lump sjim payment the day of 
the divorce and was moved to Texas by tfie plaintiff on the 
day following the hearing. She has begun her new life as 
she wished. The plaintiff made every effort to accommodate 
her in every way and he incurred substantial debt to provide 
her the cash payment she demanded. Rather than trying to 
defraud the defendant in any way, he has been entirely 
honest and accommodating. 
In the absence of the showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion, the ruling of the trial cout*t should stand. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly acted within the scope of 
the Rules of Practice for the action and time limits on the 
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motions which have been filed in this case. The judge 
waited more than fifteen days after the filing of the reply 
brief from the party opposing the Motion to Dismiss before 
ruling on the motion. In his ruling, he set forth his 
findings as to the relative merits of the positions advanced 
by each side. 
At the time of that ruling, the court reviewed 
again the property distribution based on the affidavits 
accompanying the submitted memoranda and found no evidence 
to warrant a change in his initial ruling that the division 
of property was fair and reasonable. There is no showing of 
manifest injustice or inequity to cause the appellate court 
to disturb the apportionment of the property by the trial 
court. 
By appellant's own evidence, the allegation that 
the stipulation was procured by fraud or misconduct is 
refuted. The stipulation had been filed with the court 
before the alleged conduct occurred. 
Both parties to a divorce are usually under 
considerable emotional strain during the pendency of a 
divorce action but this is not grounds to set aside a 
properly executed stipulation. There was no abuse by the 
trial court in using the stipulation and property settlement 
in the complaint as the basis for the distribution of the 
marital property. 
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The only basis for overturning the ruling on the 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment or to modify the property 
settlement is a clear abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. There is nothing in the record showing any abuse of 
discretion in this entire case. 
IX. 
REQUEST OF ATTORNEY^ FBES 
Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
provides for the payment of attorney's fees when an appeal 
taken is frivolous and without foundation. By the 
appellants own evidence, this appeal is without foundation 
in fact and therefore frivolous. The respondent has been 
caused considerable emotional stress in this matter both by 
the filing of the Motion to Set Aside tl}e Judgment which was 
also without any foundation in fact and in the filing of 
this appeal. He has suffered unnecessary legal fees and 
costs. A request for awarding reasonable attorney's fees in 
this matter to the respondent is respectfully submitted. 
DATED this £Shz day of September, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Blaine M. Coates 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
Elaine M. Coates, #4881 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 South 100 West , 
Moab, Utah 84532 
(801) 259-6901 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, '] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT, ] 
Defendant. 
No, S&03_ 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
> ROGER R- PUCKETT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Grand ) 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, being first dily sworn upon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the plaintiff in the above entitled 
matter. 
2. That the defendant and I had been married for 
twenty-seven and one-half (27 1/2) years prior to the 
granting of this divorce. 
3. That I first attempted to divorce the 
defendant in 1977 when I moved out of our residence in 
Price, Utah and established a separate residence. 
•88FEB22jn2,H7 
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4. That in 1977, about three months after I 
moved out, the defendant exhibited bizarre and eventually 
violent behavior and was hospitalized for approximately one 
month for her condition. That was the only time she has 
been hospitalized for any emotional problem during the years 
of our marriage. In 1977, I moved back into the family 
residence and resumed our relationship for the next ten 
years until I initiated the present action. 
5. I first consulted an attorney in this present 
action on Saturday, September 19, 1987. Upon advice of 
counsel, I moved out of the family residence on September 
27, 1987. During the pendency of this action, I paid the 
mortgage payments and all the utility bills (including the 
telephone) on the family residence. I also gave the 
defendant $300.00 per month to meet her living expenses 
during this time. 
6. In attempting to come to an agreement on the 
distribution of the property, I told the defendant she could 
have any of the marital assets we had accumulated but if she 
took an asset which had an associated debt,, she also had to 
assume the debt. 
7. I made no false representation to the 
defendant as to any fact contained in the stipulation she 
signed. 
8. The value of all our assets at the time of 
the divorce on November 2, 1987, was a^ follows: 
a* The home and real property located at 
1381 S. N. Kayenta, Moab, Utah: On Ma^ 1, 1987, the home 
was appraised for $61,000.00 and a refinancing agreement was 
entered into with Williamsburg Savings Banks for a period of 
fifteen years at 8 1/2% interest on a loan of $61,211.00. I 
estimate the equity in the home on November 2, 1987 at less 
than $350.00. The two adjoining acres are financed, the 
amount owing on the property on November 2, 1987 was 
$5,470.46. The last two sales of property in the area 
involved the sale of two 2 1/2 acre lots at $1,600.00 per 
acre. I estimate there is no equity in the lots as I owe 
more on them than I could sell them for at this time. The 
real estate market in Moab for unimproved property is 
practically non-existent. 
b. The 1985 Buick Park Avenue automobile 
was financed over four years at $409.93 per month. It has 
93,300 miles on it as I use it in my job. When I tried to 
trade it in in August, 1987, I was offered $1,000.00 less 
than the total of the remaining payments due. I estimate 
there is no equity in the vehicle. 
c. The 1975 Ford pickup truck has a 
trade-in value of $1,450.00 or a retail value of $2,175.00, 
d. The household furniture and furnishings 
were divided according to the wishes of the defendant. I 
told the defendant she could take anything she wanted. She 
took all the antique furniture we had accumulated, the deep 
freeze, the washer and dryer, the microwave, sewing 
machines, the dining room set, various lamps, table, etc. 
She also took all the household pots and pans, small kitchen 
appliances, all the linens except two sheets, two towels and 
two washcloths, all the draperies off the windows and all 
the books. She also took the family movie camera and all 
the films of the children. She also took a set of leather 
working tools that were a gift to me from my brother over 
thirty years ago and are irreplaceable. She took all the 
dishes and silverware, the stereo and the newer TV. What 
she did not actually take to Texas with her, I moved into 
storage in Moab for her. 
e. The 1970 GTO Pontiac has an insurance 
policy on which the replacement value is listed as 
$3,800.00. It is paid for and in her possession. I paid 
the insurance through February, 1988 on this vehicle. 
f. At the time of working out the divorce 
settlement, I sold all of the company stock available to me 
to raise the $16,000.00 paid to the defendant. My stock 
account on November 2, 1987, including my basic plan and the 
company's supplement totalled 504 shares. The total value 
of the stock on November 2, 1987 was $14,136.36 but I have a 
loan with the company of $8,127.53 whicji is secured by this 
stock. This is the maximum amount I could borrow against my 
contributions to the stock plan. The loan excludes the 
company's contributions. In October, 1987, I sold 562 
shares to obtain the $16,000.00 paid to the defendant as 
settlement in this divorce action. 
g. The value of my pension plan with Utah 
Power and Light as of November 2, 1987, was $787.93 payable 
monthly effective at age 65. I am age 53. 
h. The value of my only IRA account, with 
Williamsburg Savings, was $63.34 as of November 2, 1987 and 
still is $63.34. 
i. The savings account with Williamsburg 
Savings was closed in the summer of 1987 when we withdrew 
the approximately $700.00 in the account and took a vacation 
together. 
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j. The camper fits the back of the pickup 
truck. It was purchased in 1980 for $1,000.00. I estimate 
it to be worth at most $500.00 today. 
k. I paid $800.00 for the horse about three 
years ago. The horse suffers from azaturia which has 
damaged his kidneys and so he is of no value. He cannot be 
ridden hard or worked. The horse trailer is a 1970 model 
that was purchased at the same time as the horse for 
$850.00. It is probably worth approximately $400.00 today. 
1. The boat was purchased for $240.00 in 
1969, the trailer cost $125.00 at the same time and the 
motor is a 1958 rebuilt Evinrude that I paid $90.00 for 
several years ago. I don't know if it is still operable. I 
would estimate everything is old and fully depreciated. 
8. During the pendency of this action from the 
25th of September until the 2nd of November, the defendant 
received $194.00 in dental services, $1,378.00 in podiatry 
services and $130.00 in services from Grand Junction Ortho 
Association which was partially paid for through my company 
insurance. I paid the balance. I made the defendant aware 
of the COBRA medical provisions which allows her to continue 
her insurance with my company. 
~6~ 
9. The only additional medical services 
defendant received during the pendency of this action was 
one office visit on October 29, 1987, to Dr. Paul R. 
Mayberry for $25.00. If she was under treatment for a 
nervous condition, it is not reflected by any bills or 
insurance payments. Her office visit of October 29, 1987, 
was after she signed the Stipulation oii October 16th. 
10. During October, 1987, defendant charged 
$170.12 on our Mastercard account, $133.56 on our J. C. 
Penny account, $112.65 on our Sears account and 
approximately $64.41 in long distance qalls, in addition to 
the $300.00 per month that I was giving her to meet her 
living expenses. I have paid all these bills even though 
several of the purchases were made from! catalogs after I had 
retrieved the credit cards. 
11. The defendant had her own separate checking 
account for the last seven or eight years. Twice each month 
during the last seven or eight years on payday, I wrote her 
a check for $240.00. I paid all the household bills and 
mortgage and charge cards and accounts from my checking 
account. Her only responsibility from her $480.00 per month 
was to buy groceries for us. The defendant was employed at 
the time this action was instituted and had been for several 
years and all her earnings were at her disposal. 
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12. The defendant alone decided she wanted to 
move to Texas wherr she has relatives. I packed and moved 
everything she wanted to take with her and moved her on 
November 3rd and 4th, 1987. I allowed the defendant to take 
any of our possessions that she wanted, the only requirement 
being that if she took an asset which had an associated 
debt, she had to assume the debt also. She told me she 
didn't want the house, truck, horse, camper, etc., that she 
wanted cash. 
13. In negotiating the property settlement, I 
offered $12,000.00 at first because this was all I thought I 
could borrow and it was through negotiation and further 
borrowing that I was able to raise $16,000.00 which was what 
she wanted. 
14. The defendant expressed to me several times 
her preference for a lump sum so that she would have money 
to pay tuition to attend nursing school and begin a new life 
in Texas. I accomodated her in every way I could. 
15. In reliance on this divorce being settled and 
final and the time for appeal having passed, I married my 
high school sweetheart on December 22, 1987. 
FURTHER your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this ^ £ _ day of February, 1988. 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this XZ day of 
February, 1988, 
>mmission 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: Residing at Moat), Utah 84532 
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Blaine M. Coates, #4881 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 South 100 West 
Moab, Utah 84532 
(801) 259-6901 
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IN THE SBVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ; 
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT, ] 
Defendant. 
i Civil No. 5603 
i STIPULATION 
COME NOW the Parties and stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
1. That the Parties hereto agree to the property 
settlement as outlined in the Complaint in this matter. 
2. That the Defendant agrees tp accept 
$16,000,00 lump sum payment in lieu of alimony. 
3. That the Defendant agrees to waive any and 
all interest in the Plaintiff's pension plan and stock with 
Utah Power and Light. 
4. That Defendant understands fully her right to 
be represented by separate counsel and has had all matters 
pertaining to this action fully explained %o her. 
5. That Defendant does not intend to contest 
this divorce. 
DATED this Jlj£_ day of October, 1987. 
^±r^A:.^3?k 
Elaine M. Coates 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Roge^E. Puckett 
Plaintiff 
Carolyn &. Puckett lyn 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
) County of Grand 
On this day of October, 1987, personally 
appeared before me Roger E. Puckett, Plaintiff, and Carolyn 
S. Puckett, Defendant, and being first duly sworn, 
acknowledged to me that they executed the above and forgoing 
Stipulation. 
My commission expires: 
£7-27-90 
3lm*^M^ re 
Notary Public 
Residing in Moab, Utah 
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APPENDIX C 
Elaine M. Coates, #4881 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 South 100 West 
Moab, Utah 84532 
(801) 259-6901 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT, 
Defendant. 
1_ 
N^ >. SAQ3-
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CONNIE NAVARRE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss . 
County of Grand ) 
CONNIE NAVARRE, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the legal secretary of Elaine M. 
Coates. 
2. I was working in the law office the week of 
October 16, 1987. 
3. The defendant had an appointment to come in 
at her convenience and sign the Stipulation in this case. 
4. At the appointed time, the defendant and her 
daughter appeared at the office and after reading the 
Stipulation and a little conversation with me and her 
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daughter, the defendant signed the Stipulation on October 
16, 1987. I notarized the Stipulation and gave her a copy. 
5. I specifically told the defendant that if 
there were any terms of the Stipulation she did not agree 
with, she should not sign it, 
6. At no time did the defendant appear under 
stress and there was certainly no duress applied by anyone 
at the time she was in the office, 
7. At the conclusion of the signing, the 
defendant requested that I prepare a Power of Attorney from 
her to her daughter, Amber Sargent. This was done to her 
satisfaction. 
FURTHER your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this ^C^ day of February, 1988. 
iitiimw/urfe^ 
Connie Navarre 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ rCl day of 
February, 1988. 
I 
My commission expires: 
___/:_'5/__<7/_ 
Nota'fy Publi'c 
Residing at Moab, Utah 84532 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, \ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT, 
Defendant. ' 
> RULIfNG ON MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 5603 
On November 2, 1987, pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties regarding the distribution of their property, the Court 
granted a divorce to the plaintiff. The defendant has now 
filed a motion to set aside the Divorce Dectee as it pertains 
to the division of assets contending that s^ ie was suffering 
from mental distress at the time of the signing of the 
stipulation and that the plaintiff forced her to sign the 
stipulation by duress and threats. 
The plaintiff objects to the Motion and denies that 
the defendant was under any doctor's care for stress and 
further denies that any duress was used against her and further 
alleges that the payment of a cash amount ofc $16,000 and the 
receipt of certain personal property by the defendant was a 
reasonable and fair distribution of their atssets. 
The defendant's Affidavit presents no medical 
records or names of doctors to substantiate her claim that she 
was under treatment for mental stress at the time. She 
presents no estimates of value of assets and debts to show that 
the settlement was not reasonable. 
The plaintiff has submitted the Affidavit of the 
secretary of his attorney which states, in effect, that there 
was no duress asserted at the time of the signing of the 
Stipulation, and that the defendant appeared in the plaintiff's 
attorney's office and signed the Stipulation while accompanied 
with her daughter and after having coolly and rationally 
considered the Stipulation. The plaintiff's Affidavit has 
outlined the accumulation and debts of the parties with 
estimates of value from which the Court concludes that there 
was a reasonable distribution of assets in the Stipulation. 
The defendant has failed to establish even a prima 
facie showing of duress, or that she was subject to fraud, or 
that the agreed Stipulation was grossly unreasonable. Based 
thereon, the Court denies the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
as prayed for. 
DATED this /{/ day of March, 1988. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies o 
the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SET JUDGMENT by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Elaine M. Coates 
Attorneys at Law 
36 South 100 West 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney at Law 
4609 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
DATED t h i s /anf. day of March, 1988 
Secretary 
APPENDIX E 
Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Defendant 
4609 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355 
Telephone: (801) 942-8008 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Civil No.: 5603 
Judge: Boyd Bunnell 
The Defendant, Carolyn S. Puckett, by and through 
counsel Lowell V. Summerhays herewith moves the above-entitled 
court for an order granting oral argument in the above-entitled 
matter. 
day of March , 1988. 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
DATED t h i s 9 — 
Lowel l L< Sumir u merhai/s 
1 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT to the fol-
lowing, first class, postage prepaid, this tf — day of 
March, 1988: 
Elaine M. Coates 
36 South 100 West 
Moab, Utah 84532 
< * _ 
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Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Defendant 
4609 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355 
Telephone: (Qnl) 942-8008 
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IN IIM MVflirH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKE'I i , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLYN V Pl.K.'Kh I I , 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT 
tivii NO.p 
Judge: 
5603 
Boyd Bunnell 
ss . 
STATF nr TCYAS ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
1, l . u n l y n "'. PIN \<r\\ ,, ilo upon mv hat-h swpflr aorJ st-"> f^ 
as f o l l o w s : 
1 . That I a fit t h e D e f e n d a n t i n t h e t i t l e d 
m a t t e r . 
° . " ' **
!
 ' l a l n t i * i f H I i•(* MI n a r r i e d f o r 
twenty-seven arm oru • ' , j vorce . 
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3. That prior to our divorce, I had been hospitalized 
for a nervous breakdown and was under psychiatric care. 
4. That I was under a doctor's care for the treatment 
of a nervous condition during the pendency of this divorce ac-
tion. 
5. That I was not represented by counsel during the 
pendency of this divorce action. 
6. I could not afford to hire an attorney as I had no 
income and all our funds were in a checking account under the 
Plaintiff's name. 
7. That on October 19, 1987, the Plaintiff, Roger E. 
Puckett, came to my residence in Moab, Utah, and asked me to sign 
the Stipulation for the property settlement in this matter. I 
refused to sign the Stipulation, and told him that I was not go-
ing to accept the terms and provisions of the Stipulation, be-
cause I thought I was entitled to a more fair distribution of the 
marital assets. At that time, Roger E. Puckett pushed me around 
and threatened me physically. He tore my purse trying to get my 
credit cards from me; he hit me; pushed me against the wall; and 
inflicted verbal abuse as well as physical abuse upon me. He re-
peatedly told me that if I did not sign the Stipulation as it 
was, that I would end up on the street, and that my mother would 
end up on the street, with nothing. My mother was a witness to 
the Plaintiff's violence, and, at that time, called my daughter, 
Amber Sargent, to come to the house to prevent further violence. 
2 
0. The Plaintiff is an employee of Utah Po\ < .•.-.it 
Co. and he threatened to turn off my electricity and to never 
give me money * groceries i did not sign the Stipulation. 
9. tne e\ . October 19, 198 ". the midst 
of the Plaintiff r-1 i and physical abuse, I attempted to call 
his "i-m ey, Elairv -. Coates. I left •;-:ss<uje oi \ her •insw^r-
ing : R, buf rii not receive a call back from her. 
Ill, (i continuance the physical '..u verbal 
harrassment and violence : ;--• i - waq under 
a great deal of stress .»'* i physical and menta: exhaustion when 
this Stipulation was signed. 
II At tin" I inn-1 I signed the Stipulation, T was not 
fully aware i the consequences and ramifications nf my action. 
I was confused aiid urider a great deal of emotional stress because 
of •hH violence which the Plaintiff had perpetrated upon mo, iml 
because of my general emotional state at the time. 
I;,"1, Si iter1 ltirj" divorce has been entered, T have r A 
to the State of lexas where I am gainfully employed, and am in 
the process of rebuilding my 111e after the divorce. I n iw 
realizr »rppd into signing the Stipulation against my 
free will, and it is my desire to ask the court Im a more fair 
and equitable distribution of the marital assets whirb I In1 I"  1 ain-
tiff and I arqiilrpd owor hvnntv-seven arid one-half (27 1/2) years 
of marriage. 
3 
DATED this 2nd day of February 
1988. 
Ca 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
I S S 
COUNTY OF orange ) 
On this 2nd day o f February , 
One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-eight, personally appeared 
before me, a Notary Public in and for said County, Orange 
CAROLYN 5, PUCKETT , whose name is subscribed to the 
above instrument as party thereto, personally known to me to be 
the same person described in and who executed the said annexed 
instrument as party thereto; and duly acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same freely and voluntarily, and for the use and 
purposes therein mentioned. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed my Notary Seal at my office in vidor , 
Texas, the day and year in this Certificate first above written. 
^ J NOTARY PUBLIC 
Myra S. Boutwell 
R e s i d i n g i n Vidor , T x . , Orange County 
My Commission Exp i r es : 
2/25/88 
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ELAINE M. COATES, #4881 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for PlainH f f 
36 South 100 West 
Moab, Utah 84532 
(801) 259-6901 
IN THE COUPT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER E. PUCKETT, ] 
' I c spon i l cn t , ] 
Vfl ] 
CAROLYN S, I'UCKETT, 
UtH e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . ] 
1 Case N< 
1 CERTIFICATK 
:= A 
1- MAILING 
.1. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h n l <n» t h e _*2£_;T1 Hny o t 
S e p t e m b e r » I 9 B 8 , I ma i i e d , p o s < a g e p r e p a i d , f IMII I 4 '" I i i t" 
and i iiii(.ii«f, «i( IiKf'ilM'jiNDFN i ' S BRTRF t o t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
Lowell V Summerhays 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0. Box 1355 
Sand, y, U1 ; a h 84091-8008 
